Pictures of my Grandfather, John Bartholomew Brnjac in the Navy,
​serving his Country during WWII

Picture of Timothy John Pinner, the year he joined the Navy.
​He was 17 years old.

Pictures of my father, Mirko Ćorić as found in his biography
​"Midnight Train:  A Croatian's Search for Freedom"

Mirko riding his Triumph bicycle.

Picture of Mirko the year he left his homeland

 AM JUR-1
The authority of the United States government is supreme in its cognizance of all subjects which the Constitution has committed to it.  Consequentially, there can be no conflict of authority between a state and the United States in respect to such a matter, the former being always subordinated and the later paramount.  A state law which contravenes a valid law of the United States is void.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Conflict of Laws,” by Sonja Larsen, J.D. and Karl Oakes, J.D., Section 17, “Supremacy of federal laws,” Para. 1, pages 33-34.

AM JUR-2
A constitution differs from a statute in that a statute ordinarily provides some details of the subject of which it treats, whereas a constitution usually states broad general principles and builds the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and the government.  The constitution is the framework of the government containing the general principles upon which the government must function, intended not merely to remedy existing conditions, but to govern future contingencies.  It is a compilation of fundamental laws of the jurisdiction, and embodies principles upon which the jurisdiction’s government was founded.  A constitution is made for the people and by the people, and is, above all, an embodiment of the will of the people, deriving its force directly from the people themselves.  Statutes, by contrast, are enactments and rules for the government of civil conduct, promulgated by the legislative authority of a state.  Instead of general principles, a statute provides details of the subject of the statute.
 
Because constitutions constitute the supreme law, they preempt contrary statutes or rules, and stand above legislative law, they preempt contrary statutes or rules.  Thus, where a constitution speaks plainly on a particular matter, it must be given force and effect as the paramount law, and where a statute or other rule and a constitutional provision are in conflict, the constitutional provision must prevail.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 2, “Distinction between constitutions and statutes,” Para. 1, pages 323-324.

AM JUR-3
The term “constitution” implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature.  However, a constitution is intended not merely to meet current conditions but also to govern future ones.  The United States Constitution is said to be a law for the rulers and the people, equally in war and in peace, and to cover with its shield of protection, all classes of persons at all times and under all circumstances.
 
Although the permanent nature of a written constitution may at times seem to stand in the way of progress, its stability is intended to protect the people from frequent and violent fluctuations of public opinion since the state and federal constitutions are limitations of the power of the people as against the impulses of mere majorities.
 
Since it is recognized that the framers of a constitution cannot anticipate conditions which may arise thereafter to the progress of the nation or establish all the law which from time to time may be necessary to conform to the changing conditions of a community, constitutions traditionally do not deal in details, but enunciate the general principles and general directions which are intended to apply to all new facts which may come into being and which may be brought within these general principles or directions.  Such generality permits flexibility in construction to meet the changing conditions of society.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 3, “Characteristics of constitutions,” Para. 1, pages 324-325.

AM JUR-4
The United States is a constitutional democracy.  The constitutional form of government as it exists in the United States is based on the fundamental conception of a supreme law, expressed in written form, in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
 
Constitutional government by the people represents the greatest and grandest struggles of humanity for its betterment and in its accomplishment marks the uttermost political accomplishment of the human race.  The limitations imposed by the American system of Constitutional law on the action of the governments, both state and national, are deemed to be essential to the preservation of public and private rights, notwithstanding the representative character of our political institutions.  In the United States, the right of sovereignty is vested in the people and is exercised through the joint action of the federal and state governments.  Upon entering the Federal Union, the states retained all the power and sovereignty of the original states except such as was surrendered to the federal government.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 5, “Generally,” Para., page 327.

AM JUR-5
While statements of principles contained in the Declaration of Independence do not have the force of organic law and therefore cannot be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of rights and duties, yet it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, and the courts have sometimes referred to the Declaration in determining constitutional questions.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 7, “Pre-Constitution national documents:  Declaration of Independence; Northwest Ordinance; Articles of Confederation,” Para. 1, page 330.
 
AM JUR-6
The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established not by the states in their sovereign capacities but, as the Preamble to the Constitution declares, by the people of the United States and was adopted as their voluntary act for their own protection.  It was particularly intended to affect individuals rather than states.
 
The provisions of the United States Constitution must be given full force and effect throughout the Union because it is the supreme law of the land.  Thus, the Federal Constitution is in reality a part of the constitution of every state and may be so regarded in determining the validity of legislative acts.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 8, “Purpose, application, and effect of the United States Constitution,” Para. 2, page 333.

AM JUR-7
The Constitution of the United States and any amendments thereto, together with federal laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made under the authority of the United States, are expressly declared to be the supreme law of the land in the Constitution itself.  The Constitution as the supreme law is without qualification and is absolute and while the national government is one of limited powers, those actually granted constitute the paramount authority of the land.  The Federal Constitution is binding on all officers and departments of both the federal and state governments, including every court, whether it derives its authority from a state or from the United States.
 
No state law or public policy of a state can be allowed to override the positive guarantees of the Federal Constitution.  On the other hand, powers granted to the federal government in the Constitution cannot be exercised in such a way as to have the practical effect of nullifying important state powers expressly reserved to the states in the Constitution, and the Supremacy Clause only operates to the extent that there is an actual conflict between state and federal laws.
 
All courts, federal and state alike, take judicial notice of the provisions of the United States Constitution.
 
Since any constitutional amendment, upon adoption, becomes a part of the Constitution as much as if it had been originally incorporated therein so that it is equal in dignity to an original provision of the Constitution, it necessarily follows that amendments to the United States Constitution are part of the supreme law of the land.  All states are bound by such amendments, including states which refused to ratify them, at least to the extent that they are made applicable to the states by the 14th Amendment.
 
A state law, even if passed in the exercise of the state’s acknowledged powers, must yield, in case of conflict, to the supremacy of the Federal Constitution.  Therefore, a state constitution is of no effect where it is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and provisions in state constitutions have often been held void as inconsistent with federal constitutional provisions.  However, a federal court will defer to a state court’s interpretation of its own state constitution.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 53, “United States Constitution and amendments thereto,” Para. 1, pages 396-398.

AM JUR-9
An emergency, while it cannot create power, increase granted power, or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon the power granted or reserved, may allow the exercise of power already in existence but not exercised except during an emergency.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 54, “United States Constitution and amendments thereto – Effect of emergency,” Para., page 399.

AM JUR-10
The Federal Constitution provides that the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 55, “Federal laws,” Para. 1, page 400.

AM JUR-11
By express command of the Constitution, the judges of every state are bound by the treaties of the United States, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding,” and all courts, state and national, must take judicial notice of a treaty of the United States.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 57, “Treaties,” Para. 2, Line 14-15, page 406.

• Observation:  Among the more notable of the many treaties entered into by the United States are:
  • The United Nations Charter

 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 57, “Treaties,” Observation Section, Line 21, page 407.

AM JUR-12
Emergencies do not authorize the suspension of a constitution and its guarantees.  Thus, no new power or authority is created by a public emergency.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 61, “Effect of emergency,” Para., 1, page 412.

AM JUR-13
When interpreting a constitution, a court’s task is to read the laws as they are written and interpret them in accordance with established principles of constitutional construction.  A written constitution is not to be interpreted according to narrow or super-technical principles but liberally and on broad general lines so that it may accomplish in full measure the objectives of its establishment and so carry out the great principles of government.  A constitution must be construed with reference to the fundamental principles which support it, and effect must be given to the intent of its framers and of the people adopting it.  When interpreting a constitutional provision, a court examines its purpose and intent, and by reviewing the history of the constitution and its amendments, the court endeavors to place itself as nearly as possible in the situation of the parties at the time the instrument was made, that it may gather their intention from the language used, viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances.  It must be presumed that those who drafted a constitution had a clear conception of the principles they intended to express, knew the English language and how to use it, gave careful consideration to the practical application of the constitution, and arranged its provisions in order that would most accurately express their intention.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 62, “Generally,” Para. 1, page 413.

AM JUR-14
Constitutional language must receive a liberal and practical commonsense construction.  A constitution is made for the people and by the people, and the interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it.  
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 62, “Generally,” Para. 1, page 415.

AM JUR-15
The courts cannot ascribe to a constitution meaning that is contrary to that clearly intended by the drafters, and they must undertake to ascribe to the words of a constitutional provision the meaning that the people understood them to have when the provision was adopted.
 
When seeking the intent of the drafters interpreting a constitution, a court keeps in mind the object desired to be accomplished and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied, as well as the purpose of the provision and the historical context in which it was written.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 63, “Effectuating intent,” Para. 1, Lines 11-13, page 417.

AM JUR-16
Constitutional provisions are not open to construction as a matter of course.  Construction is appropriate only when it has been demonstrated that the meaning of the provision is not clear, and therefore, construction is necessary.  Generally, in construing a constitution, the inquiry begins with the statutory text and ends there, as well as if the text is unambiguous.  Thus, if the language of a constitutional provision is clear, there is no need for construction.  Where constitutional language is unambiguous and speaks for itself, a court’s obligation is to interpret the language from the provision alone without resorting to extrinsic methods of interpretation.  Further, neither rules of construction nor rules of interpretation may be used to defeat the clear and certain meaning of a constitution provision.  In interpreting a constitutional provision, a court’s analysis is straightforward:  if the language in the provision is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter in issue, then it must be enforced as written.
 
A constitutional provision which is positive and free from all ambiguity must be accepted by the courts as it reads and should be applied rather than construed.  When the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the court, in construing it, is not at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the instrument or to amend a constitution by judicial decision.  When the language of a constitutional provision adopted through the initiative process is clear on its face, a court will not go beyond that language in determining the voters’ intent or to create an ambiguity when none exists.  The sum of judicial construction, and also its limitation, is to determine the meaning of what has been written – not to delete sections from the constitution on the theory that if conditions had been different, they would not have been written.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 64, “Necessity of construction; ambiguity,” Para. 1, page 418.

AM JUR-17
A constitutional amendment is not to be considered as an isolated bit of design and color but must be seen as an integral part of the entire harmonious picture of the constitution.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 66, “Harmonizing amendments with antecedent constitutional provisions,” Para. 2, page 422.

AM JUR-18
The duty and function of the court is to construe, not to adopt or rewrite a constitution, and a constitutional restriction is, within its defined limits, to be enforced according to its letter and its spirit.  It is the duty and responsibility of the court to ascertain the meaning of the constitution as written, neither adding to nor subtracting from it, and neither deleting nor distorting the document.  A court’s obligation is to give to the words of a constitution a reasonable interpretation consistent with the plain meaning understood by the ratifiers.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 70, “Generally,” Para. 1,pages 426-427.

AM JUR-19
A constitution must be interpreted and given effect as the paramount law of the state, according to both the spirit and intent of its framers.  The true aim of constitutional interpretation, both as to grants of powers and with respect to prohibitions and limitations, is to give a full, liberal construction to the language, aiming ever to show fidelity to the spirit and purpose of the document.  Thus, whatever meaning ultimately is attributed to a constitutional provision may not violate the spirit of that provision.  A court will not go outside the plain language of a constitutional provision unless the intent of the language is unclear; where the language is unclear, however, the court may then look to the context, effect, consequences, and spirit of the law.
 
Whenever language is not explicit or admits of doubt, it is presumed that it is intended to be in accordance with the acknowledged principles of justice and liberty even though, according to some views, this would require a deviation from the strict letter.  A constitutional provision should receive a fair and liberal construction not only according to its letter but also to its true spirit and the general purpose of its enactment, and the interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 71, “Consideration of spirit against letter,” Para., pages 427-428.

AM JUR-20
The spirit of a constitution cannot consist of mere sophistry or fanciful or conjectural theory but must be found in those implications and intendments which clearly flow from the express mandates of the constitution as considered in the light of circumstances and historical events leading up to its adoption.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 71, “Consideration of spirit against letter,” Para. 1, Line 13, pages 428.

AM JUR-21
In construing the Constitution of the United States, what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 72, “Generally,” Para., Line 4, page 429.

AM JUR-22
A constitution is a written instrument, and its meaning does not change and that which it meant when adopted, it means now.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 74, “Implications from words of limitation and grants; words of limitation – Words of grant,” Para. 1, page 432.

AM JUR-23
Courts presume the language of a constitution was carefully selected, and words are interpreted as they are generally understood.  Courts assume that the framers of a constitutional provision and the people who caused it to become part of the constitution intended ordinary meanings for the words in the provision.  Thus, in giving effect to the intent of the electorate when construing a constitutional provision, a court looks to the words used, reading them in context and according them their plain, ordinary, and usually accepted meaning unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge them.  A constitution must be read and understood according to the most natural and obvious meaning of the language in order to avoid eliminating or extending its operation.  The words of the constitution must be taken to mean what they most directly and aptly express in their usual and popular significance and not in a vague and general sense, and in construing a constitution, the courts seek the meaning that such words would convey to an intelligent, careful voter.  When a court seeks to ascertain the meaning of a constitutional provision, it first looks to the normal, plain meaning of the language and if the language is clear and unambiguous, it will not look further.  The courts are not at liberty to disregard the plain meaning of the words of a constitution in order to search for some other conjectured intent. 
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 75, “Ordinary, natural, plain, or usual meaning,” Para. 1, pages 434-435.

AM JUR-24
In accordance with the basic rules that language in a constitution is to be deemed to have been used therein in its ordinary sense, the principle has been developed that the framers of a constitution are assumed to have employed the words used therein in a comprehensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions, and ordinarily, words in an instrument such as the United States Constitution or a state constitution are not construed as having a narrow, contracted meaning but are presumed to have been used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all contingencies.  Where words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended.
 
Stated differently, the rule is that no forced, strained, unnatural, narrow, or technical construction should ever be placed upon the language of a constitution.  Neither should the judiciary indulge in or follow any ingenious refinements or subtlety of reasoning as to the meaning of its provisions.  A court will not construe a constitutional provision to arrive at a strained, unpractical, or absurd result.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 76, “Avoidance of narrow, technical, or absurd construction,” Para. 1, pages 436-437.

AM JUR-25
Not all legislation is entitled to a presumption of validity.  It is absolutely clear, for instance, that no act of Congress or a state legislature can authorize a violation of the federal or state constitution, so no presumption of validity would apply to a statute that attempts to do so.  Further, no statute can enlarge or contract, contradict or amend, supersede, circumvent, supplant, or override a constitution or constitutional provision.  Thus, legislation that directly or indirectly impairs, limits, or destroys rights granted by self-executing constitutional provisions is not permissible.
 
It also has been held that particular types of statutes are not entitled to the presumption of constitutionality or at least to its full force.  The United States Supreme Court has consistently given a narrower scope for the operation of the presumption when legislation appears on its face to violate a specific prohibition of the Constitution.  
 
Similarly, it has been said that the presumption of constitutionality is inapplicable in civil rights cases.  As a specific example, the presumption is not present when a state has enacted legislation whose purpose or effect is to create classes based upon racial criteria, since racial classifications, in a constitutional sense, are inherently suspect.
 
The presumption of constitutionality also has been held inapplicable in cases involving other fundamental constitutional rights.  In fact, a law that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional.
 
This presumption of unconstitutionality applies especially to those rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.  Thus, any system of prior restraints of expression comes before the court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 166, “Limitations on general principle,” Para. 1, pages 25-26.

AM JUR-26
weak
Nonetheless, long-continued usage and interpretation are entitled to no weight if the statutes are in conflict with the plain meaning of the Constitution.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 181, “For particular periods of time,” Para. 1, pages 43.

AM JUR-27
If a law adopted by Congress conflicts with the Federal Constitution, then the Constitution must govern, and where there is a conflict between a statute and a state constitution, the state constitution overrides the statute.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 194, “Quantum of proof, generally; proof showing “clear,” “palpable,” or “manifest” violation of constitution – Proof showing irreconcilable conflict with constitution,” Para. 1, page 61.

AM JUR-28
The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, whether federal or state, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law but is wholly void and ineffective for any purpose.  Since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it, an unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed and never existed; that is, it is void ab initio.  Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been enacted.

Since an unconstitutional law is void, it follows that generally the statute imposes no duties, confers no rights, creates no office or liabilities, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, is incapable of creating any rights or obligations, does not allow for the granting of any relief, and justifies no acts performed under it.

Once a statute is determined to be unconstitutional, no private citizen or division of the state may take any further action pursuant to its provisions.  A contract that rests on an unconstitutional statute creates no obligation to be impaired by subsequent legislation.  No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law, and no courts are bound to enforce it.  A law contrary to the United States Constitution may not be enforced.  Once a statute has been declared unconstitutional, courts thereafter have no jurisdiction over alleged violations.  Persons convicted and fined under a statute subsequently held unconstitutional may recover the fines paid.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 195, “Generally,” All Paragraphs, pages 62-64.
 
AM JUR-29
It has been broadly stated that an unconstitutional act cannot be validated by the legislature and that a statute declared unconstitutional is deemed void from its inception and is not revived merely because the constitutional infirmity is subsequently eliminated.  Moreover, it is axiomatic that an act in violation of the provisions of the organic law may not be validated by popular vote; for example, an unconstitutional act relating to road improvements cannot be made lawful by a vote in favor of it by the people to be affected by it, apart from any amendment to the constitution.
 
There are limitations on these rules, however.  Although a legislative enactment may be invalid merely because certain limiting language in it makes it repugnant to constitutional limitations, a court cannot cure such an invalidity merely by striking the limiting language where the elimination of that language would substantially extend the operation of the enactment beyond the scope contemplated by all of its language.  Likewise, at least insofar as its future operation is concerned, such a statute may be amended so as to make it a constitutional one by removing its objectionable provisions, or by supplying others, to conform it to the requirements of the constitution.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 197, “Validation, generally; by amendment of legislation,” Para. 1, pages 65-66.

AM JUR-30
A constitutional right is a right guaranteed to the citizens by a constitution and so guaranteed as to prevent legislative interference with that right.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 400, “Constitutional guarantees,” Para. 1, page 322.

AM JUR-31
Bills of Rights are often included as part of constitutions and are intended to protect citizens from governmental transgressions of certain fundamental rights, but they are not designed to protect citizens from the invasion of such rights by individuals.  The purpose of a Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by courts.  The Bill of Rights is designed to protect people from the state, not to ensure that the state supplies minimum levels of safety or comfort. 
 
Recognized principles of “fundamental fairness,” aside from those enumerated in the American Bill of Rights, are narrow in scope; they concern matters that are basic to our conception of justice and that define the community sense of fair play, so that a failure to protect the principles in any given case would necessarily deprive a defendant of a fair trial, and are also the sorts of principles about which there can be no reasonable disagreement.
 
Primary of position in the state constitution is often accorded such a declaration of rights, thus emphasizing the importance of those basic and inalienable rights of personal liberty and private property which are thereby reserved and guaranteed to the people and protected from arbitrary invasion or impairment from any government quarter.  Such a declaration of rights constitutes a limitation upon the powers of every department of the state government.  For example, a right is “fundamental” under Montana’s Constitution if the right either is found in the Declaration of Rights or is a right without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.  Indeed, it is often specifically provided in the Bill of Rights contained in a state constitution that the sole object and only legitimate end of the government is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.
 
Bills of rights are sometimes said to be merely a declaratory of fundamental rights existing independent of constitutional declarations, and they are usually considered as being intended for the protection of individuals and minorities.  Any governmental action in violation of rights declared in a bill of rights is void, so that the provisions of a bill of rights are self-executing to this extent; however, the legislature may enact laws to protect and enforce the provisions of the bill of rights.
 
In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor below which state court decisions may not fall; as long as the state courts provide at least as much protection as the United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, then state constitutions and state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to individuals and groups.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, Volume 16A, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 404, “Bill of Rights,” All Paragraphs, pages 329-331.

AM JUR-33
Moreover, “natural law” rights, in and of themselves, are of no legal force; rather, it is the laws enacted by legislatures that define the rights of the individual.
 
Of those rights now called “fundamental rights” that bind the states through the 14th Amendment, practically all of them were at one time deemed natural rights by the American founding fathers.  This is assuredly so of freedom of religion.  Similarly, freedom of assembly and association were recognized as natural rights before they became constitutional rights.  The right to contract and the right to own property have also been termed inherent rights.  Moreover, what is embraced within the constitutional property right has been determined largely from natural right and natural law sources.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 405, “Bill of Rights – “Natural” rights mentioned in Constitution,” Para. 2, pages 331-332.

AM JUR-34
The “doctrine of unconstitutional conditions” holds that the government ordinarily may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 411, “Doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,” Para. 1, page 338.

AM JUR-35
Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, a state actor cannot constitutionally condition the receipt of a benefit, such as a liquor license or an entertainment permit, on an agreement to refrain from exercising one’s constitutional rights.  
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 411, “Doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,” Para. 1, page 339.

AM JUR-36
The doctrine functions to ensure that the government may not indirectly accomplish a restriction on constitutional rights which it is powerless to decree directly, and the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes the person’s First Amendment rights.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 411, Para. 1, Line 7, “Doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,” page 339.

AM JUR-37
The guarantee of a constitutional right ensures the citizens the privilege of having such a right judicially declared and protected, and the courts are ever alert to protect the citizen against encroachment by the sovereign, since experience has shown that where such encroachment is extended, a corresponding liberty is curtailed, seldom if ever to be restored.  Constitutional mandates cannot be avoided and individual rights violated by exalting form over substance.  There are no differences in degree of the denial of constitutionally protected liberties, and no governmental act can be approved on the ground that it is only “a little unconstitutional.”
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 412, “Enforcement of rights; against whom enforceable,” Para. 1, page 340.

AM JUR-38
The first 10 amendments to the Federal Constitution were adopted almost immediately after the adoption of the Constitution itself and are in the nature of a Bill of Rights.  Their adoption was insisted on and took place in order to quite the apprehension of many that without some such declaration of rights, the government would assume and might be held to possess the power to trespass upon those rights of persons and property which by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to be inalienable rights.  These first 10 amendments to the United States Constitution limit the powers of the federal government.  Without promise of a limiting Bill of Rights, it is doubtful that the Federal Constitution could have mustered enough strength to gain ratification.  It is well settled that these 10 amendments, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government but simply to embody certain guarantees and immunities which the colonists had inherited from their English ancestors and which had from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. 
 
Fundamental rights are those that have been guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, are traceable in some way to the state or federal constitutions, or are preservative of basic political and civil rights.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 415, “First 10 amendments,” Para 1, page 345.

AM JUR-39
Certain rights, although not specifically mentioned in the Federal Constitution, have come to be recognized as fundamental rights that are protected by provisions of the Constitution and that may not be infringed on by the government.  Thus, the United States Supreme Court has developed a doctrine that the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have “penumbras” or shadows formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.  Rights that have no textual support in the language of the Constitution but which qualify for heightened judicial protection include fundamental liberties so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed that must also be protected, such as the right of privacy, the right to travel, and freedom of association.
 
Closely allied or related to the “penumbra” doctrine is the belief that the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution recognizes the existence of rights other than those enumerated in the Constitution and that therefore fundamental but unspecified rights still belong to the people.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 417, “First 10 amendments – As protecting unspecified fundamental rights “penumbra” doctrine,” All Paragraphs, page 348-349.

AM JUR-40
The principles that embody the essence of constitutional liberty and security forbid all invasions, on the part of the government and its employees, of the sanctity of a person’s home and the privacy of his or her life.  Under this principle, homosexuals right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them a right to engage in consensual sexual activity in home without intervention of government.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16A, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 614, “Right of privacy,” Para. 1, page 659.

AM JUR-41
THE RIGHT TO USE AND ENJOY, AND TO ACQUIRE AND SELL, ONE’S PROPERTY, IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT PROTECTED BY STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16B, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 628, “Generally,” Para. 1, page 17.

AM JUR-42
THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A FUNDAMENTAL, NATURAL, INHERENT, AND INALIENABLE RIGHT, THE PROTECTION OF WHICH IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTS OF GOVERNMENT.  IT IS SAID THAT THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY LIES AT THE FOUNDATION OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND IS NECESSARY TO THE EXISTENCE OF CIVIL LIBERTY AND FREE INSTITUTIONS, AND THAT SUCH RIGHT IS ESSENTIAL IN OUR CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM. 
 
American Jurisprudence, 2d, [2009, Second Edition, Law Library Reference #KF154.A43], Volume 16B, “Constitutional Law,” by George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D, Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S.,  Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D, Thomas Muskas, J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L Grossman, J.D., Glenda K Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc., Section 629, “Nature of rights guaranteed,” Para. 1, page 19.

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